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Cooperation is often presented as one of the key concepts which differentiates multi-agent sys-
tems from other related disciplines such as distributed computing, object-oriented systems, and
expert systems. However it is a concept whose precise usage in agent-based systems is at best
unclear and at worst highly inconsistent. Given the centrality of the issue, and the different ide-
ological viewpoints on the subject, this was a lively panel which dealt with the following main
issues:
1) What is cooperation? What are its limits? How does it relate to concepts like
communication, coordination and negotiation?
2) Can a generic typology of cooperation be identified? If so, what might such a typology
look like? What are the key characteristics?
3) What sorts of cooperation are you likely to see in real multi-agent systems? How does the
degree  of  autonomy,  self  interest, benevolence, affect cooperation strategies? What are
implications of cooperation? Is it always beneficial, or are there costs associated with it that
lead to adverse effects?
4) Must cooperation be motivated a priori or can it emerge or evolve through complex social
relationships? Is it meaningful to talk about reactive cooperation and if so, how?
5) Is cooperation a mentalistic or a behavioural notion? Can cooperation be described solely
by examining the mental state of the participants (e.g. their beliefs, desires, etc.) or can it
only be described by examining their actions (i.e. irrespective of their internal state) or does
it require a mixture of the two?
6) What are the key mechanisms and structures which give rise to cooperation and allow it
to be sustained? To what extent are these  mechanisms  and  structures  necessary?  Is  it
possible to identify a necessary set of conditions for cooperation?
The range of answers to these questions were many and varied, however the main cause of such
variety was the difference in starting points (see questions 1 and 2)—Franklin offered a broad
and all encompassing definition, Norman offered a precise and constrained definition, and
Doran was somewhere between the two. The other main points of discussion related to
questions 4 and 5.
So starting with Franklin. He offers a typology of cooperationb (see figure 1)—placing it in the
a. This report is the result of a panel discussion at the First UK Workshop on Foundations of Multi-Agent Systems
(held at the University of Warwick on Oct. 23rd 1996). The three panellists and the chairman are the authors of
this document and they are listed in alphabetical order.2
context of multi-agent systems and then defining specific types of cooperation (question 2). A
multi-agent system is independent if each agent pursues its own agenda (Franklin and Graesser,
1997) independently of the others. A multi-agent system is discrete if it is independent, and if
the agendas of the agents bear no relation to one another. For example, one agent could filter
email while another gathered information on the web. Discrete systems involve no cooperation.
However agents can cooperate with no intention of doing so. The puck gathering robots of
Beckers et al. (1994) form an independent system, each following the agenda of moving in a
straight line till an obstacle is encountered and then backing off and going in another direction.
Puck gathering is an emergent behaviour of the system in that, from an observer’s viewpoint,
the agents appear to be working together, but from the agent’s viewpoint they are not. They are
simply carrying out their own individual behaviour.
The complement of independent systems are systems in which the agendas of the agents include
cooperating with other agents in the system in some way (cooperative systems). Such
cooperation can either be communicative in that the agents communicate (the intentional
sending and receiving of signals) with each other in order to cooperate or it can be non-
communicative. In the latter case, agents coordinate their cooperative activity by each observing
and reacting to the behaviour of the other, as do lionesses on a hunt (Franklin, forthcoming).
Intentional communication can take at least two forms—agents can deliberate or they can
negotiate. In deliberative systems agents jointly plan their actions so as to cooperate with each
other. Such cooperation may, or may not, entail coordination. Negotiating systems are like
deliberative systems, except that they have an added dose of competition.
Doran offers an alternative (and more tightly defined) viewpoint on cooperation. He regards it
more as a property of the actions of the agents involved (question 5). Thus, given a multiple
agent system in which the individuals and the various sub-groups therein may be assigned one
or more (possibly implicit) goals; cooperation occurs when the actions of each agent satisfy
either or both of the following conditions:
i) the agents have a (possibly implicit) goal in common, (which no agent could achieve in
isolation) and their actions tend to achieve that goal.
ii) the agents perform actions which enable or achieve not only their own goals, but also
the goals of agents other than themselves.







Figure 1: Cooperation Typology3
Note that this definition focuses on the actions of the agents and their goals, irrespective of how
they arise. Thus, like Franklin’s definition of emergent cooperation, Doran does not require that
the agents deliberate and in some sense “intend” to cooperate for cooperative problem solving
to occur. Also the definition does not require that the goals be explicit within the agents.
Consider, for example, two robots jointly carrying a large object. This would be cooperation
according to definition variant (i)—assuming that we regard each agent as having the goal of
moving the object. If two robots are building separate towers of differently coloured bricks, then
for a robot to pass a brick of the appropriate colour to another robot is an example of cooperation
variant (ii).
However this behaviouristic view of cooperation is not the whole story. For agent designers it
is important to know what leads to the choice of actions which result in cooperation. Doran
identifies two important influencing factors: (i) what types of intra-agent processing lead to
cooperative actions; and (ii) what is the basic decision principle to which agents adhere when
deciding which cooperative actions to follow. Each is now considered in turn.
Patterns of cooperative actions can arise from very different intra-agent processes. Here these
processes will be called cooperation generation processes (CGPs). Hence cooperation may be
classified (question 2) by the types of intra-agent CGP which give rise to it:
• Reflex or reactive agents simply act. Therefore when cooperation occurs it does so
without reflection upon possible actions. There is no prediction or predictive planning and
therefore no intention (Steels, 1990). Hence cooperation is “emergent”.
• Deliberative agents reflect upon the combinations of actions they and others might
perform. They are given some means to choose, in principle, between different
combinations of action, possibly after some process of negotiation, which lead to a
convergence of their behaviour. For example possible plans may be passed around,
modified, and selected as in Partial Global Planning (Durfee and Lesser, 1988; Decker
and Lesser, 1995; Doran and Palmer, 1995)
• Concept based agents are designed to maintain an explicit concept of cooperation (i.e. an
intra-agent knowledge/belief structure) which the agent uses to help select its actions and
plans and which itself may be modified in the light of experience and also may be passed
between agents The implication is that the agent possesses concept utilisation and
manipulation processes which a fortiori apply to the concept of cooperation and therefore
engender actual cooperation. Such an agent may decide to cooperate prior to any
particular set of actions being considered.
Where cooperation is by deliberative or concept-based agents, we can also classify (question 2)
cooperation by reference to the degree of altruism implicit in the CGPs.
• Purely self-interested support for cooperation. The agent deliberates, and selects only
those  (cooperative)  actions which it believes will further its own goals (Franklin’s
negotiating agents).
• Partly or wholly altruistic support for cooperation. The agent deliberates, and selects
cooperative actions which it believes to further a group’s interests (typically a group of
which it is a member) irrespective of its own particular goals (Franklin’s deliberating
agents).4
An orthogonal question to the nature of CGPs relates to where the CGPs come from. Here there
are a number of distinct sources:
• by explicit design—the creator of the agents  deliberately designs the agent’s behaviours
or rules so that various instances of cooperation occur.
• by adaptation—the creator of the agents arranges that within the “lifetime” of individual
agents  a  tendency  to cooperate is developed or augmented (i.e. the group learns to
cooperate).
• by evolution—the designer of the population of agents has arranged that CGPs are
selected for in an evolutionary process.
Given these statements about what is involved in cooperation, and from where CGPs originate
the next question addressed by Doran is what types of cooperation are appropriate in what types
of environment (question 3). He argues that what is needed to address this question is a theory
that, given the characteristics of an agent population and its goals, and of the population’s
environment, identifies: the optimal patterns of cooperation and the type of cooperation
engendering processes the agents should best incorporate to achieve it. Such a theory should
also identify the types of failure which can occur in cooperation and should predict when such
failures will happen. An initial set of failure types includes:
i) no cooperation is possible (i.e. there are no combinations of actions available to the agents
which satisfy the definition of cooperation).
ii) cooperation is possible (i.e. suitable actions can be performed by the agents) but the
agents cannot collect the information needed to decide when to perform them.
iii)cooperation and the requisite information collection is possible, but the CGPs available to
the agents are inadequate for the agents to select and execute it.
iv)cooperation is possible and executed by the agents, but there are side-effects which are
not considered by the agents and which render it ineffective.
For example, consider the two tower building robots mentioned earlier. Each robot is trying to
build a tower with blocks only of its “own” colour. Case (i) is illustrated by the situation where
each robot cannot move the other's colour. Case (ii) occurs when the robots can move but not
detect blocks of the other colour. Case (iii) occurs when the agents straightforwardly do not
select actions which aid one another (for whatever reason). Case (iv) occurs when blocks are
passed, but tower building ultimately fails because of a time overhead in “thinking about”
helping one another.
Norman offers the most precise definition of the panellists. Many of the social phenomena
labelled cooperation by Franklin and Doran would not be considered as such by Norman.
Paraphrasing Longman’s Dictionary, Norman argues that to cooperate is to act with another or
others for a common purpose and for common benefit. But what does acting for a common
purpose mean? An agent’s purpose is what drives its behaviour, but there are two primary ways
in which to give an agent a purpose. The agent may be provided with a set of behaviours that
are designed in such a way that the agent pursues some purpose; in such a control system the
purpose (or goal) is implicit in its design (a goal-oriented or purely behaviour-based control
system). Alternatively, the agent may be motivated by explicit goals, possibly derived from5
more basic motives (Norman, 1997). Such an agent may then employ planning and other
decision-making processes to direct its action towards the achievement of these goals (a goal-
directed control systemc). Are both of these broad classes of agent capable of entering into a
state of cooperation? Each agent must be individually motivated to act on the same purpose; this
is possible with both goal oriented and goal-directed control systems. However, simply sharing
the same purpose (implicit or explicit) is not sufficient for agents to cooperate (cf. (Conte and
Castelfranchi, 1995)). Consider the example described by Bratman (1992) of two people
painting a house. They share the same purpose of having the house painted, but if neither are
aware of the other, or if they are aware but neither cares that the other is also painting the house,
then they are not cooperating. Thus, there is more to cooperation than each participant having
the same purpose, they must both intend to act together (a commitment to joint activity
(Bratman, 1992; Jennings, 1993)). This is not possible without internal state, and so it is not
possible to engineer a purely goal-oriented agent system in which the agents can participate in
cooperative activity (as it is defined here)d. This contrasts with the position of both Franklin and
Doran who do not require an intention to cooperate. Having offered this strong definition of
cooperation, Norman considers a number of exemplar scenarios to illustrate what cooperation
is and under what circumstances it may occur.
The airline example. Airline companies wish to maximise their profit through ticket sales and
minimise the costs of ground services and flight windows, etc. They may increase ticket sales
by offering flights to more destinations, but this requires investment in a presence at those new
destinations. An alternative is to cooperate with another airline that provides services to these
other destinations. Suppose that Air International provides services between London and other
cities in Europe and North America, but not to other destinations within the UK, and GB
Airlines provides services between London and other UK airports. These two companies may
agree to cooperate in providing services from an airport that is served by only one of the
companies to airports served by only the other. For example, between Paris and Edinburgh. The
set of routes that these two cooperating companies can offer to customers is greater than the sum
of their individual routes. With minimum investment, but through cooperation, both companies
can benefit.
For these independent commercial organisations to cooperate, they must generate an explicit
agreement to act for a common purpose and for common benefit. The motivation to cooperate
is derived from their individual motivations to maximise profit (see Doran’s basic decision
criteria) while minimising their costs. Therefore, in certain cases cooperation is beneficial to
both parties, but also detrimental to airlines that do not cooperate because of increased
competition from other cooperating airlines. Suppose that Euro Jet is a company that offers
flights from UK provincial airports to European cities including the route between Paris and
Edinburgh. The cooperating Air International and GB Airlines are now in direct competition
with Euro Jet, cooperation that will probably reduce the revenue that Euro Jet gains from flying
this route. Successful cooperation can therefore be generated between autonomous agents that
are not a priori cooperative through negotiating a mutually acceptable agreement to which they
c. Although a distinction has been made between behaviour-based and model-based control systems, a combina-
tion of the two may prove to be the most effective solution (Norman, 1994). Furthermore, the boundaries between
the two may not be clear; behavioural competence may migrate between these layers as the agent adapts in its
environment.
d. Norman argues that his position does not preclude the possibility of engineering a goal oriented agent system in
which the agents are designed to coordinate their activities in the pursuit of implicit goals in an effective manner.
All that is being said here is that these agents are not cooperating.6
are both committed that describes how they are to act (i.e. a binding agreement of cooperative
intent).
The driving example. Consider a lorry in the middle lane of a motorway moving to the inside
lane as a car approaches from behind. To the driver of the car, the driver of the lorry is being
cooperative. Although this is a possibility, the lorry driver may not be aware of the car
approaching from behind; the lorry driver may simply be moving to the inside lane because his
exit is approaching. The car driver interprets the lorry driver’s behaviour as “being
cooperative”, but there is no true “cooperation” involved. Thus, to simply observe the external
behaviour of a number of agents is not sufficient to determine whether or not those agents are
cooperating (cf. Doran’s position).
The contracting example. The third example concerns the generation of contractual agreements
between agents for the provision of services (an example from the ADEPT project (Jennings et
al., 1996)). Consider an agent that has agreed to design a network, but for this to be achieved
the site at which the network is to be installed must be surveyed and the agent providing this
service is not capable of performing the survey (Doran’s first type of cooperation). It must
therefore gain the agreement of an agent that does have this capability. Suppose that the service
provider is aware of the consumer’s goal; i.e. to have provided a network design. The agent
providing this survey service is, in providing the service, acting in such a way that the consumer
of the service is able to achieve its goal. However, the goal to have provided a network design
is the goal of the consumer of the survey, not the provider of this service. Thus, these agents do
not share the same purpose. They both benefit from the interaction (the consumer in having the
survey, and the provider in having payment for this service), but they are not in a state of
cooperative activity according to the position presented here.
In conclusion, given these three differing positions it is clear that definitions of basic social
phenomena are important for multi-agent system research. Since all the panellists start from
different suppositions, their answers to the remaining questions are radically different. While it
is unlikely that universally acceptable definitions will emerge in the future, this panel highlights
the need for precise formulations (MIKE: put links to other panel here) and consistent use of
basic terms. The panellists feel that what may emerge in this field are definitions of a number
of different types of cooperation, rather than one all embracing definition. In this case, only
when all the definitions are taken together can the full range of phenomena which come under
the umbrella of cooperative problem solving be defined. Once reasonable definitions and
perspectives are in place, the next stage of the debate is to identify the types of mechanisms
which need to be present within the agents to deliver desirable cooperation. Such mechanisms
need to indicate when cooperation is appropriate, what forms of cooperation are appropriate in
what circumstances, and how the agents should act in the given social context to benefit most
from the potential of cooperative problem solving.
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